BUCERIUS SUMMER
SCHOOL ON
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE

2022 Conference Report

# Facing new Realities:
# Global Governance under Strain

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# 1 Executive Summary

Unusually, the Bucerius Summer School convened for a second time this year, after an extra edition in the spring 2022. Then as now, Russia's war against Ukraine largely dominated the group's discussions, with climate change and the energy crisis, economic woes and the lingering pandemic taking second place. Now in its 22$^{nd}$ year, the Bucerius Summer School in Hamburg focused on the strains these new realities put on global governance and the rules-based world order.

In the midst of what became a summer of drought for parts of Europe, 43 young professionals from all corners of the globe came to Germany. Boasting considerable experience in politics, business, civil society, academia, and the military, they participated in roundtable discussions, workshops, simulations, and site visits in the Free and Hanseatic City as well as in Berlin and Lübeck. The gathering's goal was not just to foster leadership qualities through an informed international dialogue on current political, economic, and social questions, but also to integrate the participants into a tightly knit network of alumni. This way, the organisers aim to help create strong partnerships among upcoming leaders that will serve humanity in the future.

Discussions focused on crucial issues such as how globalisation and multipolarity will develop after Russia's invasion of Ukraine; what the broader implications of a Western realignment against a Sino-Russian alliance are and where the Global South might stand in such a "Cold War 2.0; which dangers an economic recession would bring and how another arms race could be avoided; and, finally, whether new concepts such as democratic resilience and feminism in global governance can bring much needed change to a world increasingly marked by renewed great power competition.

This overall report presents the essence of the group's deliberations, with sessions recapitulated by one volunteer rapporteur from among the participants. The executive summary puts these individual reports into perspective, though without possibly doing justice to the richness of the conversations among speakers and participants.

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Roughly speaking, the debates focused on three overarching themes: First, **the new multipolarity** the world has entered; second, **today's very acute challenges** that need to be tackled; and third, those **new concepts and ideas** that are needed to maintain – and strengthen – global governance and international collaboration.

**I.** There was broad agreement that the **world already finds itself in a 'new normal',** and that global governance has to be redefined according to these realities. In fact, the end of optimism – at least in the Western part of the world – may actually date back to 2008, when the global financial crisis followed by austerity policies contributed to an erosion of democracy in many countries around the globe. Since then, two major shifts have taken place: First, a power shift towards China, and second, a shift towards digitized production, making countries more and more interdependent and interconnected. A vacuum in global leadership, in turn, whether through one country or a strong United Nations Organization, has led to a lack of collaborative global action.

Also, for the foreseeable future, **cooperative global governance will be in short supply**, because the emerging rivalry – not least between the present superpower, the United States, and the superpower-in-waiting, China – is about ideology, not interest. The main question is not whether China is trying to change the current world order, but how and when Beijing would do so. Such a future Chinese-led order, however, would pose a threat to multilateralism as well as to the values of liberal democracy and human rights. While the challenge therefore looks fairly clear-cut from an American or European point of view, many states are 'sitting on the fence', unwilling to choose between the Western and Sino-Russian side. This provides those 'in-between states' with a better voice: As newly sought-after potential partners, non-aligned and in particular developing countries experience a rare moment of power and agency in international relations.

That is, if a **major global economic downturn** can be averted. A food and energy crisis as well as runaway inflation and rising inequality already concentrate policy-makers' minds. In addition, inability to fight climate change come up as crucial longer-term issues. Both developed and developing countries are far away from an agreement on how to finance the world's green transition and adaption to climate change. Framework exists, such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda, but commitments often fall short, whether due to power competition or innovation and financing gaps. Calls for the West to restructure capitalism to use fewer resources and provide more societal welfare will only grow louder over time.

Then, there's **the pandemic** that has not yet gone away. In a special group simulation, participants worked on how communities around the world could adapt to 'living with the virus'. Despite very different points of departure, participants framed their discussions around similar themes – and came up with possible solutions: An emphasis on unity in response and togetherness, strong communication, and finding creative and innovative ways to keep public services open when dealing with recurring pandemics.

Finally, the discussions touched on the growing **influence of Big Tech** on individuals as well as the all-important role of governments and international institutions to ensure accountability. While the US dominance in this field of the past decades is well known, China now seems to be able to get its will from the digital platforms when it comes to censoring critical content or practices. This can lead to the creation of new data borders, or 'technospheres'. As data becomes more important thanks to technologies like machine learning and artificial intelligence, a reduction in data flows might precipitate yet another depression. At the same time, Russia's war against Ukraine underlines the crucial role of technology in warfare and global geopolitics: from connectivity and telecommunication to cyberwar, the use of new technologies serves to level the playing field in previously unknown ways.

**II.** This points to the second theme of **the challenges that need to be tackled today.** Here, the **Russia's war against Ukraine** was a dominant issue which participants discussed from various angles – whether it was the scale of devastation and destruction inside the country that some speakers highlighted or the need to fully grasp the Kremlin's expansionist views stressed by others. Given the situation, a negotiated and acceptable peace seems out of reach, as it is highly unlikely for Ukraine to find common ground with Putin's Russia. Still, any eventual settlement should consider how the international system could be safeguarded after the end of this major war.

Already, the war has changed the **security calculations** of countries like Germany or Sweden and Finland. For the European continent as a whole, there was a consensus that the EU had to be better able to act as a security provider in its own right. For the time being, however, it was the task of the transatlantic alliance to, on the one hand, reassure and protect its members while, on the other, avoiding any escalation that could lead to nuclear confrontation.

Going **beyond policy discussions**, two special formats allowed participants to explore the war as well as the situation inside Russia through different lenses. In a workshop at the intersection of art and political theory, they were invited to experiment with techniques of visualisation to help them better understand political upheavals. Later, the screening of a documentary of imprisoned Russian politician Alexei Navalny gave them a glimpse of a different Russia, depicted in everyday life and in small towns, where the opposition leader has the largest number of supporters.

Against the backdrop of the ongoing war, a discussion of **arms control** highlighted the difficulties of implementing this concept in today's geopolitical context. Both Russia and China are the main actors heavily investing in arms production and acquisition. While the former is bent on undermining the established control frameworks, the latter does not even want to be part of these. Inopportunely, this may lead other countries to decide that, if an arms race is unavoidable, they had better join it to maintain the power balance. In this way, the arms race could be seen to subvert the geopolitical status quo by redistributing power.

Going further on the security challenges, **peacekeeping** was raised as a major issue, whether in Afghanistan – though some questioned whether there was ever a peace to be kept – or Africa. For too long, some deplored, conflict management has mainly relied on military means at the expense of broader economic and political approaches that would address the underlying socio-economic and political drivers. And while there appears to be an urgent need for outside intervention in Africa as its own military cannot deal with the present security threats, this more robust approach would have to be accompanied by a focus on conflict prevention as well as exit strategies. Specifically, there is a need to consider the power structures of those sitting at the table when a country's future is determined in peace negotiations. This means to include all parties, in particular disenfranchised groups such as women and minorities, to build the foundation for durable peace.

Another issue raised was the need to create **water awareness** around the world. Already today, the frequency of floods and droughts is increasing and the period between two extreme episodes becomes shorter and cyclical. The international community is nowhere near achieving the 1.5 degrees Paris Agreement goal. Therefore, coalitions of governments, multilateral organizations, the private sector, and civil society should initiate innovative approaches to address both climate change and global water needs.


**III.** Which leads to the third theme of how to develop **new concepts and ideas** to address the many challenges discussed. If the current 'polycrisis' is a symptom of deeper structural flaws affecting the society and economy, the relationship of humans with one another as well as with their natural and material world would have to be re-imagined. In this thinking, a global "entanglement" where large-scale externalities endanger the very existence of humankind requires a deep rethinking of current economic, societal, and political models.

One way to **reconsider democracy** would be to perceive it less as an end state and more as a process. This flexibility allows for an appreciation of the ever-present danger of a decrease of democratic viability in a given country – that democracy, once achieved, is not a given. Hence, the idea of "democratic resilience" as an expression of how far a society is able to withstand internal or outside shocks to its political system. More importantly, this concept allows for a more disinterested answer to the question whether Western democracy is the ideal system of governance for all states. In fact, the resilience framework offers a way to discuss how basic principles could be implemented in different social contexts rather than adopting a one-size-fits-all model that, well, does not fit all.

Another promising concept is **feminism**, which aims at equality, empathy, and peaceful conflict solving. Despite the word, it works not only for women, but is universal; in theory, it can help all the people to arrive at a more peaceful world. Concretely, part of the feminist idea in global governance is that women in positions of power can help prevent future wars. Faced with ongoing violent conflict throughout the world, however, this relatively new concept still needs to be adjusted to work in practice, as more and more governments are adopting this approach.


To ensure that global governance itself has a future in a highly competitive multipolar world, it is vital to promote talented leaders who can act as agents of change. It is critical for these leaders to build networks of like-minded, critically thinking actors that strive to develop new solutions for the challenges ahead. With their open and inclusive professional mindsets and a global spirit that unites them, the Summer School's participants appear well-placed to heed that call. Good luck!


Rome, September 2022

# 2 Session reports

## 2.1 The World to Come: Globalization, Multipolarity, and the Challenges of Governance

Speaker:       *Charles A. Kupchan*, Professor of International Affairs, Georgetown University, Senior Fellow, Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C.

Rapporteur:   *Jean-Pierre Schnaubelt*, Germany

Session 1:     Monday, August 15

**The session focused on the coming world order and on how globalization, multipolarity, and the challenges of governance have transformed so far – and will evolve further in the future. Both Charles Kupchan's introductory keynote and the following discussion emphasized that we already live in a 'new normal', and that we have to redefine global governance according to these new realities.**

The world to come can already be seen in today's world: We are in the midst of global developments stretching back several years that are likely to continue for some time. Two major shifts have begun to shape what can be considered the 'new normal': First, a power shift towards China, which is gaining more influence in the world through its economic growth, technical development, and its self-confident political appearance in the global arena. Second, a shift of production mode as digitalization proceeds, making us more and more interdependent and interconnected in the process.

Both shifts, in power as well as production, have affected the way people interact with each other. In this highly globalized and multipolar world, mechanisms of global governance are more important than ever. However, due to great power politics and the geopolitical rivalry between superpowers, the world is entering a period in history where demand and supply of global governance do not match and where cross-border cooperation will become more difficult. This is especially unfortunate, as the big challenges of our time – like climate change, the COVID-19 pandemic, or migration – require global answers and, therefore, a certain level of global governance. Instead, the world to come looks set to be characterized by national egoisms and geopolitical confrontation. Multilateral cooperation is declining, and differences between the main global actors in a multipolar world are rapidly emerging.

We witness the beginning of a new bloc confrontation, dominated by China (and Russia) on the one side and the United States (and Europe) on the other side. Compared to the last confrontation of ideological blocs in the 20th century, two major changes make the geopolitical situation more instable and unpredictable this time: At the inside, both blocs are very diverse and not unified. At the outside, many states are 'sitting on the fence', unwilling to choose between the Western and Sino-Russian side.

This situation intensifies the political instability even more and puts global governance under immense strain. However, if we look further ahead, it could also be a unique chance for global governance, as the 'in-between states' now have a better voice. They could increase their influence in shaping the new world order, as both blocs will need them to accomplish their political objectives, and as they are essential to reach a minimum of global governance.

Finally, the question remains how to best adapt to the new normal and how to redefine global governance. First, there's a need to strengthen democracies as anchors of stability. This is true above all for the currently struggling democracies in Europe as well as the United States but extends to support for democracies all over the world in a time where these are globally in retreat. Second, and mindful of a world where geopolitical power conflicts are back, one should not underestimate the willingness of individual states to pursue their political goals by using force and ignoring the international rules-based order. Third, China and the West need to reset their relations to overcome today's slippery slope. What is needed is an open and fair modus vivendi, as the window for trustful relations will close soon if both sides remain on a confrontational path. Fourth, acknowledging an upcoming period of geopolitical fluidity, the Global South will increasingly gain possibilities to influence the international agenda.

At the end, this is about accomplishing an actual level playing field for better and sustainable cooperation amongst all global actors. Keeping these four points in mind, the world might just close the gap between the demand for, and supply of, global governance. To conclude with Charles Kupchan's words: "We must choose between principle or pragmatism. And in a world characterized by globalization, multipolarity, and global governance under strain, pragmatism will win."

## 2.2 After 24/2/22: Living in a Divided World

Speaker: *Robin Niblett, KCMG*, Director and Chief Executive, Chatham House, United Kingdom

Rapporteur: *Fabian Wigand*, Germany

Session 2: Monday, August 15

**The talk highlighted the major developments in what Robin Niblett calls a divided world: How increasing polarization between and within countries has brought abound the end of optimism; that the future of US-Chinese competition is not about interests but about ideology; and, finally, why the non-alignment movement has re-emerged.**

The end of optimism actually dates back to 2008, when the global financial crisis followed by austerity policies contributed to an erosion of democracy in many countries around the globe. In parallel, social media has driven polarization between and within countries, also giving rise to critical voices on globalization. Today, there are – broadly speaking – two camps in many societies: One that is globalization-critical where citizens are searching for more certainty and dignity, and another where citizens are embracing the new opportunities of globalization.

In addition to this societal change, the international system is transforming driven by Sino-American competition. This rivalry at its core is about ideology, not interest; it is a zero-sum game type of competition. Beijing fears that US engagement for democracy in 'its' region poses a long-term threat to own ambitions and even survival. In contrast Washington believes that the Chinese political system is inherently unstable and that, at some point, the Communist leadership will look for external conflict to overcome internal divisions. Furthermore, it fears that China could export surveillance technologies and tools to other countries and thereby destabilize societies in US-aligned countries around the world.

Given a renewed bipolarity, the re-emergence of the non-aligned countries is notable, in particular in the context of the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Feeling that the United States applies international law only to further its own interest and is otherwise happy to apply double standards, these countries try to stay neutral. Among many developing countries there is furthermore a feeling that Washington has left the development agenda and instead focuses its political attention and resources on a 'new Cold War'. At this moment, the United States and Europe are building an alliance of like-minded nations for those who want to join, just as Russia is forming new alliances in the East and South to avoid isolation. As newly sought-after potential partners, non-aligned and in particular developing countries experience a rare moment of power and agency in international relations.

## 2.3 Global Economic Outlook: Are we Going into a Recession?

Speakers: *Sunjoy Joshi*, Chairman, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi
*Steffen Kern*, Chief Economist and Head of Risk Analysis, European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), Paris
*Philippa Sigl-Glöckner*, Founder and Director, Dezernat Zukunft e.V., Berlin

Rapporteur: *Mainak Ghosh*, India

Session 3: Monday, August 15

**This was a free-wheeling discussion where the panellists agreed on the overarching topic – the global financial system is indeed in crisis – but proposed very different evidence for it and explored wide-ranging possible consequences. While the immediate effects of the crisis like runaway inflation, inequality, and security threats are top of mind, there are also equally important longer-term issues at stake. For example, the economic crisis might lead to data protectionism and an inability to fight climate change. To prevent this, governments need to rebuild institutional capacity and restructure capitalism to be able to provide more social welfare at the cost of fewer resources.**

As Sunjoy Joshi put it, 'A recession by any other name would hurt us equally bad'. Although policymakers and politicians are wary of calling the current economic crisis a recession – with the US even going so far as to change the very definition – its signs are already apparent in society: failed states around India; a crisis in the global financial system; property crises and lockdowns in China. The cause of this economic crisis is the cheap money given out by various central banks during the Covid pandemic. This fuelled a speculative boom in multiple assets, eventually leading to imported inflation. We are now seeing the real danger posed by these uncoordinated monetary and fiscal policies.

Another dimension of the financial crisis has been in the digital sphere. Despite financial and goods flows shrinking during both the global financial crisis and the covid pandemic, data flows continued unabated. Until recently, data was the true winner of globalization. However, as data becomes more important due to technologies like machine learning and artificial intelligence, there will be a rise of data protectionism and a creation of data borders that might lead to reduction in data flows, precipitating yet another economic crisis. Already countries like India, China, and South Korea institute data localization policies to prevent citizens' data from crossing their borders.

Policymakers in many countries have relied on digitization to modernize their economies. However, the rise of digital protectionism shows that this promise of a 'techno-haven' – where technology solves the structural deficiencies of the economy – might just be a mirage. Technology is not a panacea, and in fact, a growing digital divide between people who are skilled at using technology and those who are not might further heighten inequality.

Another failing of the financial system has been the financing of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures. Many states around the world lack the institutional capacity – societal, government or planning – to fight climate change.

While the exact solutions to each of these problems might differ from country to country, panellists agreed that there is a need to strengthen governmental and supra-national institutions to provide 'controllability to the chaos'. In this aspect, policymakers may draw inspiration from outside Western countries. As an example, Chinese policymakers are the leaders in having thought through the changes required to move their economy off coal and to renewables. It is time for the West to similarly restructure capitalism to use fewer resources and provide more societal welfare.

## 2.4 How to Increase Citizens' Participation in Europe?

Speakers: *Adam Nyman*, Director and Co-founder, Debating Europe, Brussels
*Jana Puglierin*, Senior Policy Fellow and Head, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR) Berlin Office, Berlin
*Joachim Haas*, Co-Founder buergerpolitik.org, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Pouria Fewzee*, Iran & Canada

Session 4: Tuesday, August 16

**At the core of the democratic system is the act of electing a representative government by the whole population. However, it is rarely practiced by the great majority of eligible voters, which is why the pervasiveness of voting is a crucial indicator of a democracy's health. In fact, the gap between reality and the ideal of universal participation is of concern, and the group was particularly interested in potential ways of closing this gap.**

Relevance may be the key concept in understanding not-to-participate as the decision of choice. Disillusioned citizens do not see great significance between their participation in the democratic process and their future lives, between decisions of an elected government and their unmet needs, and between themselves and the politicians. Time and again, they have witnessed governments that seemed to lack the slightest hint of understanding of their challenges and failed to make meaningful differences in their lives. They have been promised many things in pre-election times that were forgotten post-election. They have been looked down upon by elitist politicians who blatantly tried to tell them what they need, and who have failed to listen to what they have to say.

It is of utmost importance for those citizens to be convinced otherwise: That their opinions matter; that their participation would make a difference in their lives as well as those of their children; and that despite at-times fading prospects of hope, the democratic process depends on their claiming their right to participate at every step of the way. For that to happen the importance of a multifaceted approach to education was explained.

At one end of such an approach is the education of public servants and politicians: they need to learn to show up in the public and talk with their fellow citizens while acknowledging the nature of their relationship toward citizens as servants; to humbly listen to the citizens while admitting that they may never completely grasp all different ways in which life is lived in their jurisdiction and that they can only try to understand better; to diligently take note of what the citizens may need to tell them and want them to stand up for because otherwise they would forget; to prioritize those needs and to work with the relevant entities in aspiring to meet those needs while conceding that this is the reason why they are in those roles; and to report back to the citizens on the progress of their work knowing that the citizens are entitled to absolute transparency.

At the other end, there is the education of citizens: they need to learn to express their needs and to hold those in charge accountable; to understand different options that they have to choose from and to stand up for their choices; to acknowledge implicit trade-offs of each choice and the fact that no perfect choice will there ever be; to engage in activities with their fellow citizens and to know them through working towards shared goals; to look for similarities between themselves and those other citizens, and

to acknowledge that their daily lives and needs are much more similar than different, regardless of their potentially conflicting political and ideological views.

In such a multifaceted approach to continuous education for mutual understanding and accountability between public servants and citizens, the role of journalists, as well as not-for-profits and NGOs is key: reporting on activities of the government, together with echoing the voice of citizens, as argued by Jana; organizing citizen assemblies and other types of counsel for the citizens to come together and discuss their concerns and shared interests, as Adam, Jana, and Joachim explained; knocking on the doors of those citizens who have shown no interest in participation just to listen to them humbly in order to understand them, and without any other agenda beside learning from their perspectives and experiences and feeding those learnings back to relevant education components, as presented by Joachim; investing in longer term educational efforts in cementing the importance of the democratic process in the minds of children by engaging them in collective decision making processes wherever the opportunity for such processes presents itself, as Adam suggested; and, finally, lobbying for relevant policy changes to motivate more engaged citizens, such as lowering the minimum age of eligible voters, as suggested by all panelists.

## 2.5 Crisis as the New Normal? Emerging Challenges to Cooperative Security in Europe

Speakers: *Dominik Jankowski*, Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO, Brussels
*Ulrich Kühn*, Deputy Head, Arms Control and Emerging Technologies, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH), Hamburg
*Oana Popescu-Zamfir*, Director, Global Focus Center, Bucharest

Rapporteur: *Theresa Lünemann*, Germany
Session 5: Tuesday, August 16

**In these times, discussions about European security inevitably focus on Russia's war against Ukraine, its implications for regional security as well as the global order. The shared assessment seemed to be that crisis is, indeed, the new normal – at least in the short- and medium-term. It is yet too early to predict future relations with Russia and how they will shape the structures of global governance: whether there will be a return to a cooperative paradigm or whether the global order is, once again, defined by great power competition.**

The session served to counter the previous day's somewhat provocative statement that "the ways of the world are more influenced in Ohio than in Donbass". Instead, speakers as well as participants broadly agreed that the ultimate response to Russia's unjustified use of force will define the future of the international system more than the results of the upcoming US elections. This notwithstanding, they also recognized that the weakening of liberal democracy not least in the United States, the American withdrawal from the global scene, and the further undermining of the established rules-based multilateral order might have been perceived by Putin's Russia as an encouragement to aggressively overthrow the post-Cold War system.

At the same time, it is impossible to think and design Europe's future security architecture separately from the war and the future relationship with Russia. Even if Europe manages to bolster their own security and to take a stronger stand against Moscow (while reducing their overall energy dependence on Russia), there they would need the war to be over to put their approach to Russia on a new footing. And that's only before looking at the other systemic rival, China, and the looming next big challenge to reduce Europe's economic dependence on China while preserving the re-strengthened unity of the so-called West.

Therefore, the 'one-billion-dollar question' is how and when this war can end. For the time being, a negotiated and acceptable peace seems out of reach, as it is highly unlikely for Ukraine to find common ground with Putin's Russia. However, this uncertainty should not lead to fatalism: Considering that rules and a multilateral order still exist, this should spur considerations and deliberations about how the international system could be re-established and safeguarded in the future once this major war is over. Accountability for the war crimes and other violations of international (humanitarian) law will be key to any peace and reconciliation efforts and essential for regaining stability and security in Europe and beyond.

An important aspect that could be addressed more in future debates of the war against Ukraine and the disruptions it has caused to the established international order are the war's implications on and the perceptions of it in other parts of the world. While there are calls on states like India, Brazil as well as African countries to raise their voices against the war and in defence of the rules-based global order, discussions often fall short of including these perspectives. Similarly, other regions might benefit from an honest debate of the potential lessons learned from Europe's achievements and shortcomings in the run up to the war.

## 2.6    The Danger of New Arms Races

Speaker:         *Dominik Jankowski,* Political Adviser and Head of the Political Section, Permanent Delegation of the Republic of Poland to NATO, Brussels

Rapporteur:    *Devaki Erande*, India

Session 6:       Tuesday, August 16

**The arms race has always existed; over the years, it has only changed its appearance. Considering its deadly consequences, control measures of the arms races are required. However, although the ideology behind arms control sounds very good on paper, it is difficult to implement in today's geopolitical context, which changes the nature of the arms race. Hence, the big question is how to make sure that countries are accountable for their actions? Who decides the 'good guys' and 'bad guys' in an arms race? Because the arms race is here to stay, the only way to deal with it is to bring in realistic control measures.**

It was unanimously agreed that there is no "new" arms race. It has always existed and continues to exist, with a different character and different players. Arms transfers have taken place over the last few decades and are becoming more apparent with the current war in Ukraine. However, this intensification of arms trade does not necessarily make it a "new" race. As far as Russia's war on Ukraine is concerned, it rather looks like a big country is emptying its stock of arms on a small neighbour. So, it does not really seem to be an upward arms race.

Moreover, transferring weapons to countries like Ukraine seems like a good idea so that it can fight with a much powerful neighbour. However, such transfers have side effects to consider, so one question is about the mechanisms in place to prevent these weapons from falling into the wrong hands? In the end, weapons outlive regimes, as shown in Afghanistan, Libya, and Mali. Moreover, the world has seen severe effects of weapon contamination especially on the civilian population.

One counterintuitive question, however, is whether it is such a bad idea to have arms races in the first place? Rather than denying its existence, it might be better to join the race to maintain the power balance. Also, the arms race can be seen as a prerequisite for the deterrence. What could be the benefits of arms races? If you cannot stop the military race, one might as well shape it in your favour! At the same time, one could think that the money spent on weapons had better be used for education and civic responsibility. Yet not all countries think along those lines, so it is difficult to generalise. Most countries invest in the development of different weapons, and societies do not really see any issues in this because the geopolitical realities demand this kind of investment.

The arms race might be a way to subvert the status quo in the present geopolitical setting, even if it destabilizes the current order to redistribute power. Hence, the arms race is required to catalyse that transition. The arms race is always bad, but at the same time we cannot not have them. The current arms race has two main actors, Russia and China, which both are heavily investing in arms production and acquisition. However, the former is completely undermining the established control frameworks, while the latter does not even want to be part of these.

Another characteristic is the quality rather than the quantity of the arms race. Technologies like cyber warfare completely level the playing field. Although not a new phenomenon per se, this type of warfare holds the tremendous power to destroy the socio-economic fabrics of countries around the globe. Apart from this, there is a generational shift in the perspective on arms races, which lets people forget what has already happened before. The current tactics of using food and energy as arms are no new methods of waging war. For example, in Nigeria energy denial has been used as a weapon for past 20 years. However, such methods are applied more often than ever.

Finally, there is the question of nuclear weapons. These need stringent controls to be safe and need to be operated by people who understand the consequences of their use, especially the devastating fallout they produce. Rules therefore are crucial, as they can help minimize the collateral damages. However, enforcement of these rules is shaky, as some countries decide to play by them, and others do not. This is where accountability enters the picture: Rather than pointing fingers at each other, it is important to have a dialogue about the devastation of breaking rules.

Therefore, the clever way to look at arms races would be to bring in different methods of arms control and disarmament, including various UN conventions regarding nuclear and chemical weapons as well as the use of certain types of ammunition. Against this background, we need to rather focus on how we can bring the arms control to the table and make it a constant part of the political discussions. Today, there is a clear situation with more arms pouring into different parts of the world, one of these being Ukraine. It is therefore important to discuss the dangers of such arms transfers, both the external and internal. Because if it is not possible to stop the arms race, the world needs at least some working control mechanisms.

## 2.7    Democratic Resilience

Speaker:      *Oana Popescu-Zamfir*, Director, Global Focus Center, Bucharest

Rapporteur:   *New-Doe Kaledzi*, Ghana

Session 7:    Tuesday, August 16

**Democracy was first considered as an end state, but – with time evolving – is now understood as an intermediate state. What counts is the process and less the result. One of the highlights of the Summer School therefore was analysing the concept of 'democratic resilience' in this working group.**

As the name suggest, democratic resilience is about a country being resilient and able to withstand shocks. More concretely, the concept implies the ability to resist serious democratic backsliding and to bounce back after shocks may have happened. There are two stages of democratic resilience: onset resilience is the capacity to resist the beginning of democratic backsliding, whereas breakdown resilience is in place when a democracy may experience authoritarian rule but manages to prevent a complete democratic collapse.

Over the years and even quite recently, the world has seen so many events that have shaken the very foundations of democracy. Most states, if not all, are faced with some sort of democratic backsliding, and unfortunately, not all of them are able to withstand or recover from these shocks. For this reason, democratic resilience is more important than ever. However, when citizens feel unrepresented, they often try to develop solutions outside of politics.

One major test of democratic resilience is populism – "a type of politics that claims to represent the opinions and wishes of ordinary people", according to the Oxford Learner's Dictionary. The danger with this is that the needs of minority groups, which are of equal importance, can become neglected by the majority. Also, populism can eventually lead to authoritarian rule as the leader often rides on a populist wave under the guise of taking decisions based on the 'will of the people'. One way to counter populism is through political representation, allowing people to (better) voice their concerns to make them feel (more) democratically represented. And although democracy does not promise good governance, it is certainly a means to get there.

How then can we overcome this backsliding? A resilient democracy is built on free and fair elections, resilient institutions such as an independent judiciary, a media that speaks truth to power, checks facts and communicates correct information without bias, and finally on active citizen participation. That means civil society represents the needs of citizens, demanding accountability from officials in order to have a representative democracy.

During the discussion, the question of whether democracy was the right form of governance for all systems kept occurring. There is only one standard currently, i.e., liberal democracy, and it may be a mistake to try and bring everyone to that standard. Asked differently, how much can countries deviate from the expected standard based on their individual needs? Is Western democracy the ideal system of governance for all states, or could they adapt some basic principles to their own differing social contexts? The idea of democratic resilience certainly offers a conceptual framework to discuss these important questions.

## 2.8    A China-led World Order?

Speakers:    *Husain Haqqani*, Director for South and Central Asia, Hudson Institute
*Yu Jie*, Senior Research Fellow, Asia-Pacific Programme, Chatham House
*Frances Yaping-Wang*, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Singapore Management University

Rapporteur:    *Julia Harrer*, Germany

Session 8:    Wednesday, August 17


**"China is both capable and willing to reverse the global order" – this was the consensus the panel established early in the session. Thus, the core question was not whether China was trying to change the current world order, but how and how quickly Beijing would do so – and, ultimately, what this new world would look like. Torn between charming strategies and "wolf warrior diplomacy", the panellists discussed the major drivers for China's will to lead. What is behind Beijing's apparent motivation to change the rules of the global game and to dominate?**

While recognizing the flaws of the current – strained – liberal world order, the panellists underscored that a future Chinese world order could be "problematic", as it would undermine the major achievements of the present: it would pose a threat to multilateralism as well as to the values of liberal democracy and human rights. Communication and "opinion management" apparently serve as cornerstones of Beijing's strategy to dominate, both at home and abroad. Domestically, the regime maintains its stability not through securing legitimacy and trust, but by controlling people and flows of information. Internationally, China strategically uses social media for public diplomacy to propagate its positions.

One of the key arguments put forward in the discussion was that foreign policy is determined by a country's domestic situation – and China is no exception in this regard. Internal challenges will shape Beijing's ability to continue exercising power as an economic heavyweight. These include demographic change, i.e., an aging population given the long-term effects of China's previous one-child-policy, as well as the widening income gap with an urgent need to build affordable housing and offer job opportunities for younger generations. The success and legacy of Chinese leader Xi Jinping will largely depend on his ability to manoeuvre these challenges. Given the current economic situation, it is unlikely that China will reach its self-proclaimed goal to transform into a high-income country by 2025. At the same time, while China has hugely advanced economically, the United States remains the stronger military actor.

In international affairs, China continues to be an unpredictable actor that openly exercises double standards. As one of the panellists pointed out, although it is, for instance, a signatory state of a core set of multilateral treaties, it refuses to fulfil its obligations but rather suggests new rules. Regarding the Russian invasion of Ukraine, China stood at a crossroads as its biggest neighbour violated the fundamental norms of the rules-based international order and directly – and violently – interfered in the internal affairs of a sovereign country. Still, and despite its economic decline and loss of influence, the Russian Federation is, from a Chinese perspective, a major actor that needs to be integrated into the global order.

Finally, the "elephant in the room": Taiwan and security in the Indo-Pacific region. Despite a conflict looming, the panellist shared the view that China would not attempt to invade Taiwan, mostly driven by the lack of political will. This notwithstanding, one wondered, "should China ever attack Taiwan, now would be the golden opportunity". Why now? China recently experienced domestic challenges such as a strict Covid-19 lockdown in Shanghai with dramatic consequences, but without major protests or civil unrest. In turn, the final argument why China would not invade Taiwan was a very simple and humane one: would Chinese parents dare send their only child to war? Most likely not.

## 2.9   Entanglement in the Age of Nations

Speaker:      *Indy Johar*, Architect and Co-founder, Dark Matter Laboratories, London

Rapporteur:   *Francesco Montanaro*, Italy

Session 9:    Wednesday, August 17

**Indy Johar's public keynote focused on one of the most discussed and urgent issues of our era: the climate crisis. His main point was that this crisis is a symptom of the deeper structural flaws affecting our society and our economy. Therefore, it should be solved by reimagining our relationship with the future, with the natural and material world, and with our fellow humans.**

The climate and environmental crisis, caused by unprecedented levels of $CO_2$ emissions, manifests itself in many ways, such as global warming and rising sea levels, extreme weather events and soil degradation, a drastic reduction in biodiversity and the toxification of the environment. These phenomena are symptoms of the – wrong – way how societal and economic relationships are currently governed.

The concept of entanglement aptly describes our current era. We are all entangled in a situation where large-scale externalities endanger the very existence of humankind. The current economic system is ultimately based on externalities, as evidenced by the fact that 68 per cent of companies in the S&P 500 index of US stock market-listed firms produce more externalities than profits. The nation state, however, is a legal fiction that is not well-equipped to navigate these turbulent times. Nor does the 'classic' economic theory of the commons offer suitable instruments or solutions.

Therefore, a deep rethinking of our economic, societal, and political relationships is needed, Johar argued. This process should start by transforming our cities through landscape level and soil restoration projects as well as by retrofitting buildings. Cities should also be improved by launching mental health programs, which take into account a variety of environmental and economic factors.

Moreover, a new approach to economic growth is necessary to deal with the current crisis. The re-conceptualization of the notion of growth should aim to capture the increasing dematerialization of economic activities and should be congenial to circularity. Such transformation also entails an overhaul of the theory of value and property. This new theory – which he called a 'new civic economy' – should be able to price 'the act of not doing something'. This new theory may be particularly useful in pricing civic goods, which may acquire greater importance in the future thanks to smart covenants. Lastly, this new way of being, and of thinking about the position of individuals in the world, should be brought to the planetary level by a new theory of bureaucracy and technology.

The set of proposals put forward by Indy Johar triggered an interesting debate. Many participants asked the speaker to provide more details on how this plan could be implemented. In response to these questions, he stated that the worsening of the climate crisis would lead humankind to adopt at least some of such solutions. In his opinion, the conditions for this paradigm shift will arise in the near future.

## 2.10 International Peacekeeping: Lessons Learned from Afghanistan?

Speakers: *Theresa Breuer*, Journalist, Activist and Founder, Kabul Luft-brücke, Berlin
*Tim Rauschan*, First Secretary, Foreign and Security Policy, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany, London
*Sediq Sediqqi*, Former Deputy Minister for Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Interior Affairs, Former Spokesperson to the President of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, Toronto

Rapporteur: *Rajani Ghosh*, United States

Session 10: Monday, August 15

**"Speaking of peacekeeping means there is peace to be kept" – but was there in the case of Afghanistan? All three panellists grappled with this question asking Summer School participants in turn to critically investigate US policy objectives, the actual capacity of the Afghan government, and the country's future after the 2021 Taliban takeover.**

Tim Rauschan said that what started as a narrow peacekeeping mission quickly turned into state-building. This is important to acknowledge because state-building is an all-encompassing effort with goals for security, governance structures, and economic prosperity, all of which require difficult trade-offs. In practice, this involved co-opting warlords to help promote regional security, while acknowledging that doing so would undercut broader economic development. Rauschan challenged the arbitrary nature of foreign intervention timelines, when the decision to withdraw U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2022 was based on myriad factors: policy objectives being just one. He also raised the need to consider donor budgetary regulations, election cycles, and domestic pressure. The 20-year war seems long, until Rauschan reminded us that there are still U.S. troops in Germany.

Sediq Sediqqi asked participants to remember that the two-decade war is just the latest example of foreign intervention in his native country. "The geostrategic location of Afghanistan turns it into a battlefield of great power competition." Still, the past 20 years provided a golden opportunity: Afghans wrote a constitution; there was an open society with a vibrant media; and for the first time 12 million children were going to school, of which over 40 per cent were girls. Sediqqi highlighted that the development of Afghanistan during this time period was always on a Western timeline, with the West growing more and more impatient. Acknowledging the deficiencies of the Afghan national government, he explained how the lack of a coherent and overlapping strategy paired with a "peace process" leaving out the country's elected representatives led to the fall of Kabul last summer.

Looking to the future, Theresa Breuer's remarks offered important lessons for policymakers, beginning with the need to truly understand the problem you are inheriting. She said "the first nail in the coffin was that the Taliban were not included in the discussions in Bonn" in 2001. She also highlighted the need to consider the power structures that decide who is at the table and who will have a say in determining the future. To this end, Breuer emphasized the need to protect and support the women of Afghanistan who are key to any enduring peace and future prosperity.

## 2.11 International Peacekeeping: Emerging Security Challenges in North and West Africa

Speakers:    *Peace Chikodinaka Eze*, Journalist, Political Correspondent, Africa Independent Television, Abuja
*Andrew Tchie*, Senior Research Fellow, Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), London
*Tobias Thiel*, Director, GIZ Office to the African Union, Addis Ababa

Rapporteur: *Uzoamaka Ugochukwu*, Nigeria

Session 11:   Thursday, August 18

**The session critically examined the challenges of fragility and security in West Africa. There is an urgent need for outside intervention as Africa's new security threats are likely beyond its current domestic military capacity. The threat of Islamic extremism requires international military assistance, at least to the neighbourhoods of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. This entails a focus on conflict prevention as well as exit strategies, while also paying attention to the emergence of 'peacekeeping economies'. In the longer term, African governments will need to improve domestic military effectiveness.**

For the next decade, security threats from radicalization and extreme violence will increase because African governments are mostly in no condition to meet these. Their efforts in conflict management have mainly relied on the military, whereas conflict prevention requires addressing the root causes of conflict, for instance climate change impacts; poverty; forced migration etc. To do so, cooperation with civil society organisations on the ground is crucial while working with training institutes to strengthen the implementation of peace frameworks such as the agenda for women, peace, and security. This includes individual training in dialogue and mediation skills based on simulations as well as preparing civil society organisations for election observation and reporting as well as conflict prevention in the context of elections.

When violent conflict cannot be prevented and outside military intervention becomes necessary, an exit strategy has to be included in the planning of international peacekeeping as early as possible. An important lesson for African Union (AU) missions is the consideration of a sustainable post-deployment phase in conflict-affected countries. The experience of the UN Security Council-backed AU mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has demonstrated that after 15 years, the country is still very vulnerable to attacks from jihadist groups like Al Shabaab. Strengthening the existing, but overall still fragile security architectures through comprehensive security sector reforms, capacity building and peace stabilization efforts is therefore key. These should be led in partnership with the countries concerned to ensure ownership and sustainability once a peacekeeping mission is drawn down.

At the same time, a mission needs to balance divergent political interests while being aware of how 'peacekeeping economies' can develop around it. AU peacekeeping missions in Africa are often complicated by contributing nation states' political interest in maintaining the status quo of certain conflicts. For example, the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) is caught between the vested interests of countries like Uganda and Kenya. Anecdotal evidence points to Uganda selling arms to one party of the conflict,

which complicates the role of its troops embedded in the UNMISS mission as well as broader goals of the mission's mandate. In Somalia, Uganda is also the largest troop contributor to the successor to AMISOM, the AU Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS), even though its soldiers' costs are largely catered for by funding from the EU. This contributes to the emergence of 'economies' around international peacekeeping.

To avoid such unwanted effects, the Africa Peace and Security Architecture of the AU and regional bodies like the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) need strengthening. Promoting and maintaining peace and stability will entail improving cooperation between the Commissions of AU and ECOWAS as well as regional training institutes.

## 2.12 Geopolitical Outlook: Turbulence Ahead?

Speaker: *Andreas Michaelis*, State Secretary, Federal Foreign Office, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Obomate Horsfall*, Nigeria & Kenya

Session 12: Friday, August 19

**Much of the turbulence that the State Secretary saw ahead had to do with Russia's aggression against Ukraine. Whether he addressed the war's political and economic fallout inside Germany, regional security in the Baltics, or collaboration at the Franco-German and European level – Andreas Michaelis mastered the questions from participants with a mix of openness and charm.**

Diving right into the discussion without bothering with an opening statement, Michaelis gave some background on how his government had handled the crisis so far. In the initial phase, the German chancellor and the French president had jointly engaged their Russian counterpart, but as the war has worn on, strategies shifted somewhat. While Germany has not officially declared an end to top-level dialogue, Olaf Scholz stopped speaking with Vladimir Putin, instead aiming to engage Russia at different levels of government. Working through the German embassy in Moscow, the government wants to first see if things are changing in Russia and then, much later, would re-engage with the president. France's approach is quite different because Emmanuel Macron has continued to speak with Putin on specific issues such as grain exports from Ukraine, so there is no concerted Franco-German effort to end the war.

Michaelis also underlined how the crisis in Ukraine has shifted long-term strategic thinking in Berlin, as the country is developing its first-ever national security strategy. Already before the war, Europe's deficiencies in member states' foreign policies were very clear. Germany and France had been working to address these and make the EU more able to act as a security provider. Another strategic agenda will be developed in the EU's neighbourhood policy, given that the so-called Eastern Partnership to move countries like Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine closer to the EU has not been successful. Similarly, the EU's relations with North African countries are under stress, with implications for energy security as much as migration. A couple of years back, the German government had started the so-called Berlin process to stabilise Libya, and the current government has mended ties with Morocco; now, Tunisia and Algeria are to follow. Further afield, Germany is updating its long-standing Asia policy with a China strategy. While German businesses are not about to leave the Middle Kingdom, they nonetheless need to diversify, so that they are not over-reliant on one country.

With winter coming and a shortage of energy and food looming, the question turned to how European countries would collaborate in the provision of basic goods. The state secretary assured participants that all member states would support one another when it comes to important decisions like this one. In addition to the EU, the G7 could help with close coordination with the US government and others. Currently, Germany is approaching every partner it has to ascertain their plans and, if possible, get into trade and bilateral agreements with them.

When it comes to how the Baltic region is affected by the war, Michaelis argued that NATO's current strategy helped in improving not only regional security, but also that of Germany. Given the existing challenge from Russia's unprovoked war against Ukraine, he felt the alliance had done a good job in finding the right balance between reassuring its members – plus accepting two new ones, Finland and Sweden – while trying not to escalate and increase tensions along its Eastern borders. He defended Berlin's track record of delivering weapons to Ukraine, which was not easy even if the financing was there. The German armed forces, he said, had given what they could.

Still, one participant asked, does it make sense for Germany and some other EU members to treat Russia as a rational actor? After all, there is not only this particularly gruesome war to deplore, but also Moscow's complicity in money laundering as well as the use of chemical weapons. Michaelis made a point of approaching even aggressors, whether Russia or Iran, not in an irrational way but in the most principled and transparent manner. This includes taking into consideration the – often very critical – positions of Germany's eastern European allies. And while Germany presently does no longer engage Russia directly and at the highest levels, he was certain that Moscow would come back for dialogue – eventually.

## 2.13  The War Against Ukraine

Speakers:   *Owen Alterman*, Senior International Affairs Correspondent, i24NEWS television channel, Tel Aviv
*Katja Gloger*, Journalist and Author, Berlin
*Alastair King-Smith*, British Ambassador to Albania, Tirana
*Ulana Suprun*, Former Minister of Health of Ukraine, Kyiv

Rapporteur:   *Anna Shamanska*, Ukraine

Session 13:   Friday, August 19

**Each panelist presented a unique angle on Russia's ongoing war against Ukraine. Ulana Suprun, a native Ukrainian and a former member of government, told a very personal story of the war to add perspective and show its scale. Owen Alterman, an Israeli journalist, spoke about his country's neutral position and the reasons behind it. Katja Gloger, a journalist and writer from Germany who has followed the work of Vladimir Putin for many years, presented the Russian president's point of view. Lastly, Alastair King-Smith, British Ambassador to Albania, spoke about the global implications of the war.**

To the outside world the war in Ukraine may seem far away and abstract. For Ukrainians, however, it goes far beyond images and figures. The scale of devastation and destruction is enormous, as became clear by the many numbers Suprun presented: 459 verified attacks on health care facilities, 100,000 buildings destroyed, and about 270,000 square kilometers of land in need of demining – that's the size of mainland Italy. Suprun and other participants urged everyone to always put themselves in Ukraine's shoes and to advocate for continuing to provide support to Kyiv.

Empathy is not the only reason for helping Ukraine, though. According to Gloger, the Russian president does not necessarily live in the same reality as the rest of the world. In fact, he has created a different reality also for those who live in Russia. From his point of view, Ukraine is nothing but an American puppet state, and it is his, Putin's, historical mission to reestablish Russia as a great nation, partially through conquering Ukraine. For Ukraine – and for the rest of Europe – it means that there will not be peace with Russia for a long time.

The war in Ukraine does not only impact Europe, but also the rest of the world, according to King-Smith. First, it has challenged many established international institutions, such as the UN Security Council. And, as Alterman explained in his speech, the war forced many countries to take a stand. Israel, for example, found itself in a difficult position: It has a good relationship with the United States and generally aligns itself with the West, but also wants to remain friendly with Russia, which controls the sky over Syria. Also, for the sake of the Jewish population in Russia and the Russian population in Israel, Jerusalem opted for the middle ground. Then, King-Smith pointed out that the world already experienced issues with food security since Ukraine is unable to export key crops and products. The war has caused price surges in places like Nigeria and Yemen, for example. Lastly, many governments believed that a new hot war in Europe was unthinkable. Putin has proved them wrong. Today, said the ambassador, it is crucial to understand how Russian expansionists see Europe, and to create new approaches to national security based on that view.

## 2.14  Coordinating the German Security Policy in Times of Crisis

Speaker:       *Wolfgang Schmidt*, Federal Minister for Special Affairs and Head of the Chancellery, Berlin

Rapporteur:   *Anna Kneifel*, Germany

Session 14:   Friday, August 19

**Any discussion on German security policy these days, is dominated by the war against Ukraine – and the keynote of Wolfgang Schmidt and the ensuing discussion were certainly no exception. For Wolfgang Schmidt, (i) the war against Ukraine, (ii) Germany's planned energy transformation, and (iii) the emergence from the COVID-19 pandemic are the three priorities that will shape German security policy in the near-term future.**

In his keynote, Wolfgang Schmidt illustrated how the war against Ukraine had triggered a remarkable shift in German security policy (e.g., the 180-degree turn regarding defence policy in the wake of the invasion of Ukraine), whilst dramatically underscoring Germany's energy dependency on Russia, which provides Germany with 55% of its imported gas. Schmidt perceived any policy response to the latter to be closely intertwined with Germany's planned energy transformation and ambitions to make Germany carbon neutral by 2045 – a shift would not only benefit the environment but also make Germany less energy dependent on Russia. At present, Germany remained heavily dependent on Russia, a fact that is exacerbated by Germany not having a state-owned gas company, no LNG terminals, and having twice decided to phase out nuclear energy. A boycott of Russian gas imports would be no easy feat, and "the winter will obviously be difficult." Ultimately, any policy decision would boil down to a balancing act between "hurting Putin's government more than the hurt inflicted on our own society."

While an inaugural national security strategy was currently under development, the establishment of a National Security Council for Germany was now opposed by the Green Party, who currently hold the Federal Foreign Office.

With regards to mixed migration flows, Schmidt remained optimistic: As Europe's strongest economy, surrounded by friendly neighbours, Germany would continue to build on its "remarkable success" of 2015 when it comes to admitting and integrating refugees and asylum seekers, whilst maintaining an openness to (skilled) labour migration.

With regards to the emergence from the COVID-19 pandemic, Schmidt flagged that, domestically, Germany's current law would expire on 23 September while, internationally, the COVID pandemic had unleashed a "perfect storm" of public health implications, inflation, and now rapidly increasing food prices and growing food insecurity – the latter two emerging as a consequence of the war on Ukraine.

In closing Wolfgang Schmidt advised that in times of crises, it was important to also not lose sight of mid- and longer-term goals. With regards to his personal longer-term goals, however, Wolfgang Schmidt, remained guarded in response to a participant's question. In politics, after all, "a week already is a long time."

## 2.15 Apocalypse Right Now!

Speaker:  *Henk Ovink*, Special Envoy to the United Nations and Flood Expert, Water Ambassador of the Netherlands, The Hague

Rapporteur:  *Rufina Boateng*, Ghana

Session 15:  Saturday, August 20

**This workshop touched on a range of issues around the crisis potential of water supply and the damaging effects of climate change: Water resources are among the sectors most sensitive to climate change due to their direct relationship with climate variables. Therefore, this session called for the need to create water awareness around the world, to build institutional capacity and coalitions amongst governments, multilateral organizations, the private sector, and NGOs, and to initiate innovative approaches to address global water needs.**

Globally, climate change continues to pose a serious threat to ecosystems, food security, water resources, health, and economic stability. Thus, climate change increases water and food scarcity, displacement, and the need for humanitarian assistance, as well as contributes to conflict and disrupts economic stability. The reality today is that the frequency of floods and droughts is increasing and the period between two extreme episodes becomes shorter and cyclical. In fact, Henk Ovink presented a grim outlook on the climate crisis, as the international community was highly unlikely to achieve the 1.5 degrees Paris Agreement goal.

There is an opportunity to invest in water as leverage for climate resilience, but also the need to plan and be innovative around water resources across the globe. However, the main challenge in tackling water demand and climate change is to deal with the vested interests and politics among different governments and stakeholders.

Reflecting on the discussion, I realized that climate change disproportionately impacts people living in poverty or who are marginalized. This has affected a lot of countries, including Ghana, which, statistically, has experienced a 1.0°C temperature increase since 1960. It is important to note that, as temperatures and sea levels rise, people increasingly experience heat waves, droughts, floods, cyclones, and wildfires that upend their lives. These observations concur with the speaker's point about the need for all stakeholders to come on board. Climate-driven population displacement, migration, and water and food insecurity undermine regional stability across Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and Latin America.

Addressing the climate crisis therefore requires a holistic approach to development. Both the African Union (AU) and the sub-regional Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) agree that climate change does have effects on peace and security on the continent. ECOWAS is already active in the fight against climate change through several sectors (energy, agriculture, livestock, water, infrastructure, health, climate services, disaster risk management). Consequently, it embarked on setting up National Early Warning and Response Mechanisms in each member state. The AU Commission, in turn, approved the African Union Climate Change and Resilient Development Strategy and Action Plan (2022-2032).

In the end, there is the need for everyone regardless of race, ethnicity, or colour to pursue action in order to protect our environment and to seize the opportunity that tackling climate change presents. Together we can make a difference for a healthier and more prosperous planet.

## 2.16 Reconfiguring and reconnecting the city, the state and the world

Speaker: *Benjamin Tallis*, Centre for International Security, Hertie School of Governance, Berlin

Rapporteur: *Livia Puglisi*, Germany

Session 16: Saturday, August 20

**The Summer School's workshop on war, migration and geopolitics examined in which way conflict and migration affect different scales of society. Russia's war in Ukraine has raised the awareness of the delicate interrelationships and fragile interdependences on issues like supply chains and energy security. It has also roused society as a whole. However, beyond countering Russia's aggression, the wider geopolitical shifts also demand a resilient tool kit for all actors involved in crisis management.**

The workshop experimented at the intersection of art and political theory on how to switch from academic analysis to operative methods of policy. The aim was to learn how techniques of visualisation could help the understanding of political upheavals. This required to see geopolitics from a different angle than one is used to, and to change perspective. Participants therefore used collages to express their findings, putting items and ideas together that at first sight did not seem to belong to one another. The most challenging task was to use the available material in the best possible and most creative way but also to get the message across.

The group's case study focused on the war in Ukraine and its effects on different institutional levels such as the city, state, and supranational dimension. Accordingly, Kyiv and Berlin were the two cities, Ukraine and Germany the two states, and the UN General Assembly as well as the EU the two supranational entities examined in more detail. Three separate teams took very different approaches: some started chopping up paper straight away, whereas others first started discussing about the content before getting into practice. All were driven and motivated by team spirit and the possibility to make use of individual talents of expression and handicraft.

One subgroup pictured the capitol Kyiv, building a two-level collage showing the different realities war can come along with. Next to the brutal and devastating effects of war, some sort of presumable normality continues to exist. The collage therefore was flexible, allowing the user to switch from one reality to the other like turning pages. Black was chosen as primary colour for the war level, representing the destructive force of war and violence. Crosses cut out of red paper sheet symbolized deaths, blood, and cemeteries next to blue tears as signs of grief and sadness as well as paper helmets and soldiers. The 'normality' side was made of green paper and showed peace doves, hearts, and a smiling sun – symbols of love, trust, and hope.

Although each team represented a different institutional level, they realized that they used similar symbols and colours in their respective collages. However, the interpretation diverged depending on who dealt with or looked at the art piece. A circle could have been interpreted either as unity and a symbol of perfection, or as a vicious circle, or as never-ending captivity.

Recurring narratives were signs of division, contrasts, opposites, and frontiers, but also of emotions caused by the consequences of war like hatred, love, empathy, and hope. In the specific case of Ukraine, the collages showed that war had not only broken apart families, but also infrastructure and buildings. It had divided the world into aggressors and defenders, leading to vivid and rancorous emotions.

"Reconfiguring and reconnecting the city, the state and the world" as the workshop title goes, implicitly assumes that all levels of institutions should be interacting. The collages revealed that similar concepts and ideas were elaborated on all levels. Interpretations though can vary and so options for action can differ. What participants missed, though, was the lack of a Russian point of view. Whether one agreed with this perspective or not, it would have been interesting to examine and to see how it would have been expressed artistically.

Still, a major lesson learned from this workshop was that the beauty of art combined with the unpredictability of social transformation led the group to "find politics where we least expect it", as Benjamin Tallis put it.

## 2.17 Working Group I: Age of Global Diseases

Speaker:    *Nadine Godehardt*, Researcher, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

Rapporteur:    *Brian Kirk,* United States

Session 17:    Saturday, August 20

**This workshop touched on the topic of global disease, crisis response planning, preparedness, and community resilience. The scenario was about an unknown, new disease spreading throughout the world and reaching Germany, with participants tasked to find practical solutions to resolve the crisis. Three overarching themes resulted from the workshop: An emphasis on unity in response and togetherness, strong communication, and finding creative and innovative ways to keep public services open with the understanding that the virus may be part of a 'new normal' for the community to deal with.**

Trying to find a community approach to deal with the new virus, participants spilt into two groups. The first took the perspective of the public and specifically looked at public places such as parks, supermarkets, and restaurants to try to find innovative ways to keep essential services running while mitigating the worst effects of the disease. The other took the perspective of the home and made recommendations that could be implemented by all residents in the community.

Despite their different points of departure, the two groups framed their discussions around similar themes – and possible solutions.

1) Unity of response and togetherness: Both groups analysed the new virus from the lens of the recent pandemic. COVID-19 and the response to the virus caused or exacerbated deep divisions in many communities. The teams wanted to try to avoid these divisions by finding ways to encourage a unified community response to the virus, promoting the idea that we are "all in this together". A unified approach keeps the community strong and allows it to overcome the worst effects of the virus more rapidly. Precautions that every individual takes help the wider community. While the local government cannot mandate changes in the home to mitigate the virus, leadership can encourage the implementation of recommendations that will help each individual family while also contributing to a unified, community approach to tackling the virus.

2) Communication: Each group highlighted the importance of communication in implementing any response to a pandemic. From the perspective of the individual home, messaging focused on first taking steps to protect yourself and your family. A variety of measures were recommended such as an improvised decontamination station used at the entrance of the home and limiting natural light into the home as sunlight accelerates the spread of the virus. Further messaging focused on taking measures in the home to limit the spread of the virus outside of the home into the neighbourhood and greater community. From the public approach, messaging centred on the unified community approach and on taking steps to mitigate the virus in public places. The goal was to keep as many services open as possible such as neighbourhood parks, supermarkets, and restaurants. Every individual can make a difference in the community and by gaining buy-in from residents, mitigating measures work more effectively, and community divisions are not exacerbated.

3) Finding creative solutions to keep services open: Balance is required to protect public health while keeping as many services open as possible. From the outset, the team looking at public spaces took the approach of trying to maintain services and not default to closing everything. Access was limited to certain public places, physical measures were undertaken to limit the effects of the virus, and personal protective equipment was used. For example, the park was kept open by limiting the number of people present, conducting temperature checks and decontamination prior to entering the park, spraying down surfaces such as playgrounds with water to kill the virus, and limiting hours to the park to avoid maximum sunlight during the middle of the day. Restaurants were switched to takeout only, and innovative ways were found to shuffle people through the takeout line without spreading the virus. At the public library, use of e-books was encouraged and for those reading hard copy books, a book drop was set up with a refrigeration unit to slow the spread of the virus. Books were then decontaminated at the library prior to reissue. At the supermarket, delivery of groceries increased, both to the home and to cars waiting in the parking lot. Only non-essential services such as night clubs, bars, and bike-sharing stations were closed.

Overall, the teams used lessons learned from the COVID-19 pandemic to better prepare the community to counter new viruses. Personal protective equipment and decontamination agents were stockpiled and were readily handed out to residents and businesses after the new virus took hold. A Task Force at the community level worked with local leaders, businesses, and residents to understand concerns, find innovative solutions to keep the community running, and keep an open flow of communication to all its members to better understand the virus, mitigate the spread of the virus, and protect themselves, their families, and the community at large. As new public health measures were released, communication accompanied these measures so that all members of the community understood the reasoning for the measures and bought into the measures. The overarching goal was to keep the community unified and informed, and to limit divisions that can cause a breakdown in implementation of public health measures.

## 2.18 "Navalny: Poison Always Leaves a Trail" (Movie Screening)

Speakers: *Yulia Navalnaya*, Economist and wife of Russian opposition leader Alexey Navalny
*Maria Pevchikh*, Investigative Journalist, Activist and Head of the Investigative Unit of the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK)
*Leonid Volkov*, Russian politician and Chief of Staff for Alexey Navalny's campaign for the 2018 Presidential Election
*Ali Aslan*, International TV Presenter and Journalist (Moderator)

Rapporteur: *Shahira Wassef*, Egypt

Session 18: Saturday, August 20

**Echoing the Summer School's theme *Facing new Realities: Global Governance under Strain*, the ZEIT Foundation organised a private screening of the movie *Navalny: Poison Always Leaves a Trail*. The documentary follows Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny through his political rise, attempted assassination, and search to uncover the truth. The movie was followed by a moderated panel discussion.**

The screening of the movie was timed with the second anniversary of Navalny's poisoning on 20 August 2020, one of the main elements and unravelling journeys the movie covered. This and the presence of Navalny's wife, Yulia Navalnaya, the film's director Daniel Roher, who also featured in the movie, as well as Maria Pevchikh and Leonid Volkov gave an opportunity to be very close to those involved in the documentary.

The setting allowed the group to learn first-hand how the speakers felt about the events that took place and the situation today. Leonid Volkov, for example, reported that Navalny, who has been detained since his return to Russia on 17 January 2021, was doing mentally and physically well given the circumstances. He had been fully aware of the likelihood of his arrest once he arrived in Russia, but planned to return regardless, as Russia is his home country. His close ones nonetheless were trying to keep him from going back immediately after his release from hospital, for him to first recover after the attempted assassination through poisoning.

The documentary attempts to spread awareness about Navalny's story, as public attention does provide him with a certain protection, according to Maria Pevchikh. Also, Daniel Roher confirmed that the shooting of the movie was very overwhelming but that he would not change a thing about it, as he believes disseminating the movie and keeping people engaged plays a role in maintaining the public's notice. Today, Navalny continues to work, Volkov said, giving his team strategic guidance from prison. Maria Pevchikh explained that communication with Navalny cannot happen directly but must go through hand-written notes, as only his wife, relatives, and lawyers were allowed to visit him – the latter also for investigations related to alleged terrorism.

As per Alexei Navalny's wish, the movie is meant to be a "thriller" and a reminder that Russia is not Putin. The war in Ukraine, which Volkov labelled as "Putin's war" rather than "Russia's war", reveals the Russian President's true nature and why he wanted to kill the opposition movement. Volkov argues that polling shows that the numbers of war supporters are a minority. Instead, "Russian people are victims of Putin's regime", Volkov claimed. The West may so far have had a concerted reaction to the war, but – in his opinion – it is not strong enough.

Navalny represents the "other leadership" that could have been the Russian people's choice. A choice mostly seen in small towns, where the opposition leader has the largest number of supporters. Roher said he admired Alexey Navalny, his wife, and the team's courage, labelling the making of the documentary "the opportunity of a lifetime". To end on an optimistic note, the film director said "should there be a Navalny 2 movie, it would be covering his presidential campaign"…

## 2.19　European Security in the Baltic Sea Region

Speakers:　*Olevs Nikers*, President of the Baltic Security Foundation, Riga
*Gary S. Schaal*, Professor, Chair of Political Theory, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg
*Captain (N) Christoph Mecke*, Head of Naval Concepts and Development Branch, German Navy Headquarters, Rostock
*Katja Gloger*, Journalist and Author, Berlin

Rapporteur:　*Agnieszka Ignaciuk*, Poland

Session 19:　Monday, August 22

**Historically a hub of international exchange and cooperation as embodied by the Hanseatic League, the Baltic Sea region's security is currently under strain. The ongoing Russian invasion in Ukraine, rising military tensions, energy security dilemmas, and the growing influence of China characterise today's increasingly complex situation. The outbreak of a 'hot conflict' in Europe calls for an urgent reflection not only on the capabilities required to ensure stability, but also on how a cooperative regional security architecture could look like.**

The session focused on outlining the security challenges around the Baltic Sea, with a special emphasis on Russia's revisionist and aggressive policy in the region and beyond. The panelists discussed the consequences of the war in Ukraine for regional stability along with Russian disruptive military activity in the maritime and air domains. Also, the build-up of anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) capabilities in the Kaliningrad exclave contributes to a challenging security environment. More generally, Baltic Sea security should be viewed in conjunction with the broader strategic situation in the High North and the Arctic.

The ensuing discussion focused on finding the right responses to growing regional instability. As Russia's aggression against Ukraine constituted the "rudest wake-up call", one speaker underscored the need to increase defence capacities for capabilities to match the existing strategic reality. At the same time, with Russia's confrontational posture and the risk of unintended military accidents remaining high, it was argued that a well-balanced, non-escalatory strategic communication remains equally important for managing the existing tensions and keeping the European unity *vis-a-vis* the Kremlin.

While heightened geopolitical competition and military tensions persist, the Baltic Sea region is also characterised by an abundance of institutions of cooperative security. Some obstacles, however, prevent closer regional security cooperation, including heterogeneous threat perceptions and differing levels of trust among respective regional actors. Against this backdrop, participants discussed the consequences of Finland and Sweden's upcoming NATO accession, which also impacts on the EU's role as a security actor.

As to the issue of a future cooperative security architecture, speakers underscored the need for military de-confliction as a prerequisite for trust- and confidence-building measures. Some also underlined the role of societal resilience and preparedness, contrasting these with the radicalization and 'militarization of thought' in today's Russia. Nevertheless, they highlighted the importance of international cooperation as the key instrument to ensure long-term security and stability of the Baltic Sea region.

## 2.20   Feminism in Global Governance

Speakers:      *Anastasiya Shtaltovna*, Program and Communication Officer, Parliamentary Centre, Research Fellow at Montreal Centre for International Studies, University of Montreal, Montreal
*Johanna Kaminska*, Advisor to the President of the European Parliament on Foreign Affairs, Brussels
*Cornelius Adebahr*, Political Analyst and Entrepreneur, Berlin

Rapporteur:   *Sergey Kislitsyn*, Russia

Session 20:   Monday, August 22

**Feminism is a very popular and important approach in contemporary theories of governance and international relations. It has also become a part of practical policy for many countries. Feminism talks about equality, empathy, and peaceful conflict solving. It works not only for women, but is universal; in theory, it can help all the people to arrive at a more peaceful world. However, in the turbulent present it is facing serious challenges and many answers have yet to be found.**

*"A feminist approach is something like a healthy lifestyle."*

It is obvious that women play a significant role in international politics. We can see a lot of conflicts and crises all over the world where women participate actively and try to change the situation.

The Ukraine war shows this very well. The country faces a huge refugee crisis: More than four million people have been forced to flee the country and at least 6.5 million people are estimated to be internally displaced, both disproportionately women and children; also, around half a million are now in Russia. A trend analysis conducted by the United Nations shows that women, children as well as people with disabilities and diseases are facing immense hardships. At the same time, Ukraine has one of the highest numbers of women in the army in comparison with other NATO countries. Also, Ukrainian women are actively engaging as volunteers, so in times of crisis the situation can also become *less* gender specific than during normal times.

The very idea of feminist foreign policy is not about crisis management but about preventing and solving conflicts. Women are leading a lot of the anti-war and peace movements. They try to escape the power games, confrontation, and different tensions in world politics. They also bring new ideas and new perspectives. And these perspectives are peaceful. Sweden, in fact, was the first country that formally declared to have feminist foreign policy. Nowadays, we see a lot more countries implementing it, as the governments of Canada, France, Germany, Mexico, and Spain have already declared to have a feminist foreign policy. So, the process is going on.

Just how should a feminist foreign policy look like? Is it a paradigm or a tool, or a theoretical and practical approach? The answer is relevant especially when it comes to formulating long-term strategies and policies. For example, how can we devise a feminist approach to a country which is a competitor or even an adversary? How can feminist ideas solve national security issues? These questions are still without an answer, which means that feminist foreign policy currently faces some logical restrictions as a concept.

At the practical level, several governments have used a "3R+D" formula for feminist policies. This means a focus on rights, representation, and resources, to which diversity is added as a cross cutting issue. The latter also implies women's participation and representation in decision-making bodies. So, women must be involved in such

questions as: How are budgets decided? Where is the money going to? What kind of programs should be established? It also means that women must participate in foreign policy decision-making and share their perspectives on different issues in the sphere.

At a higher level, some may assume that feminist foreign policy means empathy, even though this emotion is nothing inherently female. Still, feminism can be an effective provider to this more universal and not gender-specific subject, reflecting the changing nature of humanity as a whole. Because of the lack of the better word, this concept can be framed as feminist foreign policy, even though the final focus should be on diversity and human rights. Ultimately, people can build a new perspective that is going to have human rights and democracy at its core values.

Also, it should be mentioned that there cannot be feminist foreign policy in a non-feminist society. It needs diverse and female representation also on government boards, so that a critical number of women can share their perspectives and participate in decision-making. This would be a very changing point, because so far there is a lack of women in executive positions. For example, women who work in security and defence struggle with scepticism and prejudices about their professional qualities. They have to prove their competence and experience more than men. This is a real problem that prevents efficiency gains.

Finally, some critical problems remain. The feminist idea in global governance is that women in positions of power can help to prevent future wars. However, the concept was created in a peaceful period compared to the contemporary situation of a turbulent world going through very conflictual changes. The concept of feminist foreign policy must be adjusted to work in practice, finding an answer to the very real and tough conflict solving. This is the main challenge in this sphere.

## 2.21   Tech, State & I

Speaker:       *Samir Saran*, President, Observer Research Foundation, New Delhi

Rapporteur:   *Archish Mittal*, India

Session 21:    Tuesday, August 23

**Focusing on the intersection of technology companies, individual citizens, and global governance, the discussion stretched from evaluating the growing influence of big tech on individuals to the all-important role of governments and international institutions to ensure accountability, and further to the crucial role of technology in warfare and global geopolitics. The session was a good reminder of the dominance of the digital age and its irreversible consequences at both levels – micro and macro.**

In line with the Summer School's overall topic – "Facing new Realities: Global Governance under Strain" – this session turned out to be a clarion call for big tech conglomerates across the world to rethink, re-evaluate, and reassess their approach to privacy in the digital age. Participants recognised a growing need for accountability by tech giants such as Google, Facebook, and Amazon, which – due to their sheer size and influence – often get away with breaching or bypassing regulations around the world, especially outside the United States. The EU's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) is a "muscular policy" which has propelled policy makers around the world to enact stringent measures to check the digital giants' influence. Despite these efforts, however, there is still a huge need for the public and private sector to work in tandem to ensure data protection and accountability.

The tech industry is currently going through its 'Standard Oil moment'. More than a century ago, US anti-trust regulators ordered the split of the dominant hydrocarbon company of the time given its monopoly on refined oil production. In tech today, massive consolidation efforts, aggressive acquisitions, and the giants' growing influence in the private sector have prompted governments to curtail their influence. Already, people are influenced in ways that were previously unthinkable – whether it is day-to-day lifestyle, consumer habits, or behavioural patterns. It is not about collecting residential addresses anymore, but about social media handles determining how people are perceived in the world. Such immense power over individuals requires checks and balances that must be designed and implemented by the governments.

In addition to influencing the behaviour of individuals at the micro level, big tech has a massive impact on the macro level of global governance and geopolitics. For instance, China, the only country in the world which has successfully created digital ambassadors, can go to the digital platforms, challenge nations, and engage with people with almost zero accountability. This has caused distress to policy makers around the world. Similarly, the Russian invasion of Ukraine has signalled the extremely important role of technology in warzones, from connectivity and telecommunication to cyber warfare. Russia is not only attacking with brute force but is also trying to limit the flow of information within Ukraine and its communication to the outside world.

To protect the interest of individuals (the "I"), it is ultimately the responsibility of the state to work closely with the private sector and limit the rising power and influence of tech giants globally.

## 2.22  Sharing the Burden? Climate Change and Inequalities

Speakers:    *Camilla Bausch*, Scientific and Executive Director, Ecologic Institute, Berlin
*Fernando Brancoli*, Associated Professor, Federal University of Rio de Janeiro
*Paulo Alexandre de Toledo Alves*, Director of Sustainability and Private Partnerships, Ministry of Regional Development of Brazil, Brasília

Rapporteur:  *Max Bouchet*, France & United States

Session 22:   Tuesday, August 23

**The global community struggles to find solutions that meet the scale of the impact of climate change. Framework exists, such as the Paris Climate Agreement and the UN 2030 Agenda, but commitments often fall short, whether due to power competition or gaps in innovation and financing. However, sharing the burden of climate financing is essential to account for the unequal effects of, and responsibility for, climate change between people and countries.**

The worst effects of climate change have moved from imagination to evidence. Already, the year 2021 showed record atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations, with associated heat waves, ice melting events, and the rise of global sea levels. In the summer of 2022, wildfires erupted from California across most European countries all the way to Chongqing in Central China. In Africa, record droughts accelerated hunger crises and the displacement of vulnerable communities.

However, the global community still lacks the adequate leadership and coordination to appropriately respond to such climate-related patterns. Vested interests and power competition hindered progress regarding the "phasing down" of coal-fired power and the ambitions of Nationally Determined Contributions during the latest Conference of the Parties (COP) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), in short: COP26.

Global governance is particularly challenged in its political and financial abilities to fairly share the burden of climate financing between countries of the Global South and North:

-   Political tensions have emerged over how to proportionally share the investments required to mitigate and adapt to climate change. According to data from the Centre for Global Development, developed countries are responsible for 79 percent of carbon emissions between 1850 and 2011. Countries from the global South ask for financial responsibility to be tied to these historical factors, arguing that they "joined the dinner table late, but are now asked to pay the same bill."
-   Consequently, global climate frameworks recognize a "common but differentiated responsibility and capacity". In effect, they ask countries to "self-differentiate" their climate objectives based on their contribution to aggregate global carbon dioxide emissions.
-   However, the financial commitments of developed countries do not live up to their promises. While they pledged in 2009 to jointly mobilise US$100 billion a year to address the needs of developing countries, annual climate finance aid has systematically remained below $80 billion, as outlined in a recent study.

These failures undermine the trust necessary for global collaboration. The pervasive narrative that developed countries do not pay their fair share of the burden and instead use their power to control natural resources in developing countries further weakens cooperation.

In this context, the global community needs to rely on new sources of leadership and solutions:

- The growing awareness and activism among populations has put pressure on negotiators and political leaders. Youth movements around the world call for greater ambitions and accountability from governments to bring financial flows in line with the demands of the climate crisis. While national governments often fall short on their ambitions, a constellation of local actors, from mayors to civil society, has emerged as an alternative source of leadership.
- As the world becomes increasingly urban, the effects of climate change have intensified in cities. The need to adapt housing and infrastructure and to transition local economies has positioned community leaders at the forefront of climate governance. Recognized as a key partner in the Action Agenda of the Paris Agreement's "fourth pillar," cities and communal actors increasingly engage in formal and informal diplomacy to advocate for higher ambitions and unlock new funding. For example, the C40 network of nearly 100 cities worldwide strives to drive urban action against climate change, as it represents one quarter of the global economy.
- Leadership in climate action also increasingly comes from countries in the Global South. For instance, Namibia kicked off a new climate and sustainability framework including tenders for business action at scale. In addition, cities in Latin America, including Mexico City, Bogota, and Buenos Aires, have led the way in the global movement of local actors embracing and committing to the UN 2030 Agenda.

A widespread movement to bridge the South-North financing divide, to increase cooperation, and to rebuild trust among the global community therefore is under way. The next global climate conference will take place in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt in October 2022. Thus, COP 27 may come to embody this process as an 'African COP'.

## 2.23   Global Governance and the Future of Multilateralism

Speaker:        *Shashi Tharoor*, Member of the Indian Parliament, Chairman of
                the Standing Committee on Information Technology, New Delhi

Rapporteur:   *Raviraj Kulkarni*, India

Session 26:    Wednesday, August 24

**The session's discussion highlighted the challenges posed to global governance and multilateralism: A leadership vacuum due to a lack of collective and collaborative global action has resulted in a backlash against globalization. It has furthermore been coupled with a weak United Nations where little or no intervention is made to prevent war as in the case of Ukraine. Participants therefore discussed the possibility of developing another mechanism for global governance which could potentially serve as an alternative to the UN.**

The breakdown of globalization was marked by the end of the unipolar world dominated by the United States and exacerbated by a new strain in Sino-American ties. A crumbling liberal order coupled with a feeble UN system had given rise to illiberal regimes breaking the rules. A prime example of this is Russia's war against Ukraine, which poses an existential challenge to today's global governance and multilateralism. However, the solution primarily lies in stepping out of the echo chambers that the liberal order is trapped in, and to engage in fresh ideas and to foster international solidarity as the only way ahead.

The backlash against globalization began in economic terms and was fueled by popular leaders fighting on the platform of protectionism. It became increasingly difficult for liberal leaders across the world to justify to their people why jobs were being shipped overseas and how that stood to benefit them. This in turn gave rise to a cultural backlash against foreigners and particularly immigrants.

The Covid-19 pandemic accelerated the disintegration of the already fractured model of global governance. China's unwillingness to be transparent and permit access to the World Health Organization (WHO) in the early days of the virus' discovery essentially bolstered the argument against global cooperation. It ensured most people would look inwards toward their own governments as the only resort in times of crises. Countries like India which were to be the backbone of the global vaccination initiative COVAX refused to export vaccines as they prioritized their own citizens. Similarly, the United States restricted raw materials for vaccine manufacturing for quite some time in the early days of the pandemic, resulting in the stalling of global supply chains.

The fault lines in global governance also exposed the limitations of multilateralism under the UN umbrella. The discussion highlighted the much-restrained role played by the world organisation during the ongoing Ukraine war. Unlike in previous conflicts, there was no attempt by the Secretary General to directly intervene to prevent the hostilities. In contrast, during the Cuban missile crisis, then-Secretary General U Thant directly negotiated with the two superpowers and thus obviated an escalation into (nuclear) war. In more recent times, Secretary General Kofi Annan attempted a similar intervention during the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. Clearly, for Tharoor – a long-time and high-ranking UN official who came second in the race for Secretary General in 2006 after Ban Ki-moon – today's UN leaves much to be desired as far as reigning in belligerent members is concerned. The authority of the Secretary General must be exercised to uphold the fundamental tenants of the UN Charter, he argued.

However, it is important to note that the dismantling of multilateralism commenced prior to the current conflicts seen in the world. The United States exiting the Paris Accords in 2017 and thereafter leaving the WHO in 2020 were two important milestones of this breakdown of the global governance. The Brexit referendum taking place in the United Kingdom had already exposed the disgruntlement against multilateral engagement as far back as 2016. In its aftermath mainstream politicians felt compelled to play to the gallery and change their stance. Then-British Prime Minister Theresa May's statement at party conference rang the alarm bell that multilateralism was indeed under threat, including in 'the West': "If you believe you are a citizen of the world, you are a citizen of nowhere. You don't understand what citizenship means."

Despite these glaring concerns, the discussion concluded that the United Nations does indeed remain the most important body for global multilateralism. Even though there have been obituaries written for it on numerous occasions, it has withstood past crises. Alternatives to the world body do not appear realistic, nor is fundamental reform possible. However, ensuring that the current mechanism functions more efficiently is vital. It is equally important for regional partnerships such as The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of Australia, India, Japan, and the United States to work towards protecting global governance and strengthening multilateralism. All of this ought to be done bearing in mind the UN's inherent limitations, as by definition of its charter it is a platform for countries to come together not to serve as a global government.

The looming threat of a belligerent China only underlines the importance of rules-based global governance. As the West works out sanctions to weaken Russia, it risks placing Moscow firmly in China's arms. The greatest lesson offered by the UN is that the world is a better place when countries engage in dialogue.

In order to ensure that global governance is protected beyond the framework of multilateralism, it is vital to promote talented leaders who can act as agents of change. It is critical for these leaders to simplify the benefits of globalization and communicate them effectively to their electorates such that the message is enshrined in them. No matter how difficult a task it is, the burden does lie on the shoulders of responsible leaders who – whether they like it or not – have to do the heavy lifting against the easily won rhetoric of protectionism.